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The fundamental issue in asylum adjudication has been described as ensuring that those at 
risk of persecution on their return are afforded the protection to which they are entitled under 
international and national law, while preventing those who are not at risk from exploiting the 
asylum process as an alternative route of entry. Information on the situation in a particular 
country or region is essential both for judging the objective risk of harm upon return for the 
asylum seeker and the assessment of the claimant’s narrative. Judges and decision makers 
therefore need to have access to detailed, reliable and up-to-date information. It is equally 
important that they do not reach dramatically different conclusions on the same material as 
this would jeopardise the predictability of decision making, rendering it arbitrary and unfair. 
The manner in which guidance is provided on how questions of law and fact are to be 
interpreted in order to achieve consistency and predictability varies between countries, 
depending on their legal systems and traditions. In the United Kingdom, a system of Country 
Guidance cases has developed which provides guidance on the situation in a particular 
country or region. This is to a large extent binding on similar cases. In Sweden as well as in 
many other European countries, there is no similar system. In this working paper, it is 
discussed how the matter of country guidance is approached in Sweden and the United 
Kingdom respectively. It is suggested that for a system of country guidance cases to be 
introduced not only does a number of practical requirements need to be fulfilled; it is equally 
necessary that providing guidance on matters of fact rather than on purely legal matters is a 
task accepted and embraced as such by the courts and one that is considered compatible with 
the legal tradition of the country in question.  
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1. Introduction  
The judgment of asylum cases is complicated. The fundamental issue in asylum adjudication 
has been described as ensuring that those at risk of persecution on their return are afforded the 
protection to which they are entitled under international and national law, while preventing 
those who are not at risk from exploiting the asylum process as an alternative route of entry.
1
 
This requires judges and first-tier decision makers to address a number of factors: the 
credibility of the narrative presented by the asylum seeker and whether any claims of 
persecution can give rise to an acceptable likelihood of risk of harm, and a consideration of 
whether the harm feared by the asylum seeker falls within the scope of protection in 
international, regional or national law, the situation in the country of origin and the risk of 
future harm to be inflicted upon the asylum seeker if returned.
2
 These issues involve the 
assessment both of matters of law and fact, both of which are fundamental for establishing 
whether or not a person is a refugee in accordance with the refugee definition expressed in 
Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees
3
 (the Refugee 
Convention) or whether the applicant is eligible for subsidiary or alternative protection.  
Judges and administrative decision makers are required to take into account a number of 
sources when assessing the validity of a claim for protection. These include the relevant 
national and international legal framework, national and international jurisprudence, and 
statements and interventions concerning the interpretation of matters of law by UN agencies 
such as the Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or 
organisations such as the International Red Cross Committee (ICRC) and country of origin 
information (COI) concerning the country in question. COI, or background country materials, 
is derived from a number of sources, including legal materials, reference works, reports, 
papers and other statements by international bodies such as the UNHCR or the United Nations 
treaty monitoring bodies, reports by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), reports by 
national bodies, and media clippings, as well as information obtained from other asylum 
claims.
4
 Information on the situation in a particular country or region is essential both for 
judging the objective risk of harm upon return for the asylum seeker and the assessment of the 
claimant’s narrative. It is therefore essential that judges and decision makers have access to 
detailed, reliable and up-to-date information. It is equally important that they do not reach 
                                                 
1
 Robert Thomas, Administrative Justice and Asylum Appeal: A Study of Tribunal Adjudication, Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2011, 16.   
2
 Sir Nicholas Blake, President, Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber UK, ‘Luxembourg, 
Strasbourg and the national court: the emergence of a country guidance system for refugee and human rights 
protection’ paper, 4 November 2012, para. 13. The paper was presented at a seminar held by the Refugee Law 
Initiative 22 November 2012. It was later published in the International Journal of Refugee Law (2013) 25 
(2):349-372.   
3
 UN General Assembly, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.137, entry 
into force 22 April 1954.  
4
  “Judicial Criteria for Assessing Country of Origin Information COI): A Checklist” a paper for 7th Biennial 
IARLJ World Conference, Mexico City, 6-9 November 2006 COI-CG Working Party International  Journal of  
Refugee Law (2009) 21 (1): 149-168 
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dramatically different conclusions on the same material as this would jeopardise the 
predictability of decision making, rendering it arbitrary and unfair.
5
  
The manner in which guidance is provided on how questions of law and fact are to be 
interpreted varies between countries, depending on their legal systems and traditions. One 
instance upon which positions vary is the extent to which precedents are considered binding 
or authoritative on an inferior court, or on a court that has decided a particular case.
6
 A second 
example is the approach held by judges on ‘making law’ – and whether this is something that 
judges do, can do, or should do.         
Providing guidance for lower courts and administrative authorities, whether in the form of a 
legally binding precedent, an authoritative statement or merely in an advisory capacity on 
matters of law could be considered relatively unproblematic, since higher courts are presumed 
to have both the competence and time to reflect on complicated legal issues and to make 
authoritative statements applicable beyond an individual case.
7
 With regard to precedents on 
matters of fact, such as how to understand the situation in a particular country or region in 
general, or for a particular group, then things become more complicated. The notion of 
‘complicated’ does not imply that it would be more difficult to interpret matters of fact than 
those of law. Rather it refers to that of giving guiding statements, especially when such 
statements and interpretations are considered binding. It is a complex business both for 
reasons of legal tradition and the nature of the guidance that courts of a higher instance are 
expected to provide, and for more practical reasons. The latter, for example, refers to the fact 
that the political and security situation in a particular country might be susceptible to rapid 
change, so that precedents of this kind can quickly become outdated and in need of 
replacement. Yet, in asylum cases in particular, the need for guidance and consistency on how 
a particular situation is to be interpreted is essential both for the development of jurisprudence 
and (not least) for the legal security of the asylum seeker.  
The objective of this working paper, against the background provided above, is to discuss the 
different approaches adopted by the United Kingdom (UK) and Sweden. The intention is to 
highlight the pros and cons of the methods chosen and to discuss why a particular procedure 
has been selected. Sweden and the UK have been singled out for illustration because both 
countries are among the top five receiving countries
8
 in the European Union (EU), and 
because there appears to be taking place a certain amount of transnational judicial dialogue 
between the two jurisdictions.
9
 Furthermore, the legal traditions of the two countries are 
distinctly different.  
                                                 
5
 Blake 2012, para. 16.  
6
 H. Patrick Glenn Legal Traditions of the World 2
nd
 ed. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004.  
7
 Whether this is true or if it is a conventional view that does not take into account the different functions 
performed at different levels of the judicial hierarchy is a matter for discussion.  
8
 UNHCR Asylum Trends 2012. Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries UNHCR 2013.  
9
 Perhaps it is more correct to refer to it as a conversation where one party speaks and the other mostly listens, 
given the fact that UK judgments are occasionally referred to by Swedish courts. However, the opposite does not 
often happen.  
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For the purposes of this investigation a small number of interviews with Swedish and UK 
judges and administrative decision makers were conducted.
10
 The interviews have mainly 
been used as background material for a better understanding of the systems in all their 
complexities. Given the fact that the issue of country of origin information and guidance as 
well as the matter of the status and nature of a legal precedent and the role of the judge – to 
say the least – is comprehensive, I do not intend to provide any final answers on this matter 
but rather to point to a few interesting aspects.    
2. Sweden 
 2.1. Some notes on the Swedish legal system   
As it cannot be assumed that all readers are familiar with the details and peculiarities of the 
Swedish asylum system, this section will begin with a brief introduction of the Swedish legal 
system, and the asylum process in particular. The Swedish legal system, as with the 
Scandinavian legal systems in general, is often considered to be a civil law system. As the 
Scandinavian legal systems, however, differ from the legal systems of Continental Law 
Europe on certain important points – in the limited use and importance of all-embracing legal 
systems or concepts as well as legal formalities, the lack of large, systematic codifications, 
and the absence of an actual reception of Roman law, to mention a few – it is probably more 
correct to regard them as a separate legal family.
11
 The school of Scandinavian Legal Realism 
and its approach to what the law is and what it ought to be, advocating a naturalistic, positivist 
approach to law and rejecting influences of metaphysics upon scientific thinking in general 
and legal thinking in particular, has also had significant influence on the Scandinavian legal 
tradition.
12
 Though the influence of this particular school of thought is now much less 
dominant than it was fifty years ago, its legacy remains traceable in the manner in which 
Swedish jurists perceive the law and what it means to interpret and implement it. 
In recent years European law both in the form of EU law and the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) has had a substantial influence on national law in Scandinavian 
countries, as has (in certain spheres) American and UK law. The impact of international law 
varies substantially depending on the field of law.
13
 The ECHR was incorporated into 
Swedish law in 1995 and is, so far, the only human rights treaty to be accorded this 
status.
14
As Sweden adheres to the dualist tradition, international treaties must become 
Swedish law in order to be directly applicable in national courts.  
                                                 
10
 Those interviewed requested anonymity.  
11
 Ulf Bernitz “What is Scandinavian Law? Concept, Characteristics, Future” 13-30 (20) in What is 
Scandinavian Law? Peter Wahlgren (ed.), Scandinavian Studies in Law, Vol. 50, Stockholm Institute for 
Scandinavian Law, 2007.  
12
 See e.g. Jes Bjarup “The Philosophy of Scandinavian Legal Realism” (March 2005) Ratio Juris 18(1), 1–15.  
13
 On the impact of international law on Swedish law and jurisprudence, see Inger Österdahl & Rebecca Stern 
(eds.) Folkrätten i svensk rätt Stockholm, Liber 2011.  
14
 Swedish Code of Statutes - SFS 1994:1219.  
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Swedish law recognises four main sources of law: legislation, preparatory legislative 
materials, case law and legal doctrine.
15
 Legislation is the primary source, while the 
remaining three are secondary and are applied to interpret the law in a specific case. The 
preparatory works are particularly important in the Swedish legal tradition. As a result, the 
preparatory works are usually comprehensive and quite detailed though the level of this detail 
varies depending on how the legislation in question is formulated and to what extent the 
legislator has intended to leave room for interpretation for those applying the law. 
Additionally, the older a certain piece of legislation grows then with it more importance is 
attached to the case law of the courts of higher instance. It should be mentioned in this context 
that in the Swedish legal system precedents are not legally binding. In practice, however, 
judgments by the supreme courts are very influential and will in general be followed by the 
lower courts. If, however, a lower court deviates from a precedent this does not constitute 
sufficient grounds for an appeal. If the case is appealed there is nonetheless a good chance 
that the appeal will succeed, provided the court of appeal does not decide to agree with the 
new interpretation. As for international courts, judgments by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union are, in accordance with EU law, binding on Swedish courts, as are judgments 
by the European Court of Human Rights when concerning Sweden. Decisions and similar 
statements on individual communications by international treaty monitoring bodies such as 
the Human Rights Committee, however, do not have this legally binding status. Foreign legal 
decisions have no legal authority as such in Swedish law.     
There are two parallel systems of courts in Sweden: the general courts, dealing with criminal 
and civil cases, and the general administrative courts concerned with cases relating to public 
administration. Both sets of courts are organised in a three-tier system. For the general courts 
there are district courts (tingsrätter), courts of appeal (hovrätter) and the Supreme Court 
(Högsta domstolen). With the general administrative courts there are administrative courts 
(förvaltningsrätter), administrative courts of appeal (kammarrätter) and the Supreme 
Administrative Court (Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen). In addition, there are a number of 
specialised courts and tribunals, for example concerning migration or environment-related 
cases. 
2.2. The Swedish asylum appeals procedure in brief     
In 2005 the Swedish asylum system was the subject of a major reform aimed at transforming 
the asylum procedure from an administrative process, where appeals were handled by the 
Aliens Appeals Board, into a proper two-party process, thereby enhancing the transparency 
and legal security of the system and benefiting the applicant.
16
 The reform introduced a 
system in which the Migration Board remained the body of first instance but where appeals 
were handled within the general administrative courts system. The first level of appeal is the 
Migration Courts, which are not separate courts but divisions of the administrative courts in 
four cities. The second and final level is the Migration Court of Appeal, which is a division of 
the Administrative Court of Appeal in Stockholm. The current asylum procedure, which 
                                                 
15
 For an introduction to Swedish law, see Laura Carlson The Fundamentals of Swedish Law 2
nd
 ed., Lund, 
Studentlitteratur 2012. See also Stig Strömholm Rätt, rättskällor och rättstillämpning, 5th ed., Stockholm: 
Norstedts Juridik, 1996, chapters 15-18.  
16
 Prop. (Government Bill) 2004/05:170 Ny instans- och processordning i utlännings- och 
medborgarskapsärenden. The reform also meant the introduction of a new Aliens Act, Swedish Code of Statutes 
- SFS 2005:716. 
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entered into effect on 31 March 2006, is thus a comparatively new system where judges as 
well as other stakeholders – first-tier decision makers, presenting officers, and lawyers – have 
had to acquaint themselves with (for many) a relatively new field of law and procedural 
system, and with all that this entails.
17
     
Unless a case is deemed to be simple, judges in the administrative courts are assisted by three 
lay assessors (nämndemän). Judgments of the Migration Court can be appealed to the 
Migration Court of Appeal. In most cases that are dealt with by the general administrative 
courts, the judgment of an administrative court of appeal can be appealed (provided certain 
formal conditions are met) to the Supreme Administrative Court. However, except in certain 
rare cases, the Migration Court of Appeal is the court of last resort in cases concerning 
immigration, asylum and citizenship. In neither the Migration Court nor the Migration Court 
of Appeal are judges formally required to be specialists in migration law in order to be 
appointed. In practice, however, working at a Migration Court or at the Migration Court of 
Appeal inevitably leads to a certain level of specialisation. At the same time, most judges at 
the Migration Courts or the Migration Court of Appeal also adjudicate in other types of cases, 
such as tax and social insurance cases. Few judges choose exclusively to confine their careers 
to migration law; one reason for this perhaps being the relatively low status that migration law 
has so far enjoyed among judges and lawyers.
18
    
Leave for appeal is required before a case can be reviewed by the Migration Court of Appeal. 
Leave is granted if “it is of importance for the guidance of the application of the law that the 
appeal is examined by the Migration Court of Appeal or there are other exceptional grounds 
for examining the appeal”.19 As of 1 July 2013 leave for appeal can be limited to a particular 
question arising in a case and does not need to apply to the case in its entirety.
20
 If leave is 
denied, the judgment of the Migration Court is final. A decision to deny leave to appeal as 
such cannot be appealed. The Migration Court of Appeal can also remit decisions to a 
Migration Court or to the Migration Board.  
2.3. Migration Court of Appeal precedents; country guidance in particular  
The primary task of the Migration Court of Appeal is through precedents to provide guidance 
to the lower courts and the Migration Board and for the application of the law in general. The 
responsibility of the Migration Court of Appeal to contribute to the advancement of Swedish 
migration law, jurisprudence in particular, is clearly stated in the preparatory works.
21
 Since 
its creation in 2006 the Migration Court of Appeal had by June 2013 delivered about 300 
judgments. Some 259 of them have to date been reported and included in the Court’s database 
on guiding judgments.
22
 The fact that a judgment by the Court is not reported does not 
                                                 
17
 Interview, Judge 1.  
18
 Interview, judge 2.    
19
 Aliens Act Chapter 16, Section 12.  
20
 Prop. (Government Bill) 2012/13: 45 En mer ändamålsenlig förvaltningsprocess, 142-144.   
21
 Prop. (Government Bill) 2004/05: 170 Ny instans- och processordning i utlännings- och 
medborgarskapsärenden, 133.  
22
 www.dom.se.  
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indicate that it is not a precedent. However, the judgments reported are those that are 
considered by the Migration Court of Appeal to be of particular importance.
23
 The decision on 
which judgments are to be reported is made by the Court itself.
24
 The precedents available 
concern both procedural and material issues of law. The emphasis in the early days was on 
establishing the framework for the transformed process in migration matters. Examples 
include clarifications of the applicable sources of law,
25
 the allocation of the burden of 
proof,
26
 and the right to legal counsel.
27
 As a consequence of the relatively limited number of 
cases so far to be granted leave to appeal by the Migration Court of Appeal, the Migration 
Courts – the first-tier courts – in the vast majority of cases effectively become the courts of 
final instance. The three Migration Courts being equal in status and independent in relation to 
one another, they are not formally obliged to harmonise their case law or assessment on either 
matters of law or fact. As a result, the case law of the three first-tier courts has occasionally 
been different on certain points.  
In the process leading up to the establishment of a new appeals system the appropriateness of 
enjoining a court that normally is not of the last instance the task of producing precedents in a 
field of law in which interpretative guidance was so clearly needed was questioned by several 
stakeholders, one being the prominent Legal Council (Lagrådet).
28
 The current system has 
continued to be criticised on a number of counts, including the requirement for a leave to 
appeal (i.e. that a case is not granted an appeal merely on the basis of how the evidence has 
been assessed or that the decision of the lower court is questionable on some other account
29
), 
the limited number of cases where a leave to appeal is granted (since 2006 approximately less 
than 10 per cent
30
) which has resulted in a number of important matters both of a procedural 
and material nature to remain so far uncommented on by the Migration Court of Appeal and, 
also, the reluctance of the Migration Court of Appeal to provide country guidance.
31
 Such 
criticism has been voiced both by external commentators such as NGOs and refugee law 
practitioners and (though perhaps in a more diplomatic manner) by the Migration Board and 
the Migration Courts.  
As the explicit role of the Migration Court of Appeal is to provide guidance, views on what 
should be covered by such advice and direction have been manifold. From the very beginning 
                                                 
23
 Rebecca Stern Ny utlänningslag under lupp Stockholm, Svenska Röda Korset, 2008, 20, SOU 2009:56 Den 
nya migrationsprocessen, 205-206.  
24
 RIK 6 §, SOU 2009:56, 205.   
25
 MIG 2006:1.  
26
 Ibid.   
27
 MIG 2006:2.  
28
 Lagrådets (Legal Council) expert opinion May 2005, 4–12.   
29
 SOU 2009:56, 200.  
30
 Interview, Judge 1.   
31
 SOU 2009:56, 200 ff. See also Annika Lagerqvist Veloz Roca Gränsöverskridande. En förvaltningsrättslig 
knäckfråga Juridiska fakultetens skriftserie nr 77, Stockholm, 2011, 11-21.  
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the Migration Board and the Migration Courts have sought directions from the Migration 
Court of Appeal on both matters of law and fact. This has particularly concerned the topics of 
how to assess the situation in a particular country or region, or a consideration of the potential 
protection status of a particular ethnic or social group – what might be referred to as ‘country 
guidance’ (though the concept encompasses more than a strict assessment of country 
conditions).
32
 The Migration Board of Appeal, however, has so far declared that it will not 
issue such guidance. The reasons provided by the Migration Court of Appeal have been  i) the 
task of the Court is to provide guidance on legal issues, not on the situation in a particular 
country as the latter is not a matter of adjudication; ii) it is for the parties in a case to provide 
country information they considered relevant for the case and the court will base its judgment 
on what was presented to it; and iii) the situation in a country or region can be subject to rapid 
change, making it difficult for the Migration Court of Appeal to provide country guidance that 
is sufficiently updated, given the time-consuming process of identifying a suitable case to 
form the basis of a precedent and then drafting said judgment.
33
 If such guidance were to be 
presented, representatives of the Court have argued, the situation in a country would need to 
be revisited and precedents on such issues reviewed regularly.
34
  
The reluctance of the body of final instance to provide country guidance has proved to be a 
source of frustration for both the Migration Courts and Migration Board.
35
 This 
unwillingness, as mentioned earlier, has been argued to risk creating inconsistency in how the 
conditions of a certain country are assessed between the Migration Courts. It has also been 
argued that there is a danger that particular country conditions, or the situation for a particular 
group, are not as thoroughly assessed as desired, given the limited time and resources 
available to the Migration Courts.
36
 The negative effects for the individual asylum seeker, as 
well as for legal security in general and the reliability of the system, are obvious.   
The Migration Board has applied different methods for providing internal guidance for 
decision makers and presenting officers on matters of law and fact. A number of various 
internal documents referred to as ‘guiding decisions’, ‘clarifying decisions’ and ‘signals’, 
have been introduced over the years. In 2009 the Migration Board reviewed its system for 
providing guidance for internal use and the concept of ‘legal position papers’ was introduced, 
replacing previous steering documents.
37
 Legal position papers are described as general 
recommendations on the implementation of laws and regulations within the field of activities 
of the Migration Board, aimed at ensuring a uniform application of the law within the Board – 
in other words, the Board’s position on a certain issue. The legal position papers are the 
responsibility of the Head of Legal Affairs. At the time of writing close to 60 legal position 
papers had been issued by the Board covering a number of issues, including advice on how 
                                                 
32
 Ibid.   
33
 SOU 2009:56, 201.  
34
 Ibid.  
35
 Interview 3, senior official Migration Board, interview 5, judge.    
36
 Ibid.    
37
 Migration Board Annual Report 2009, 12.  
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the situation in a particular country, or for a particular group, should be assessed.
38
 The 
position papers are published in the Migration Board online country and legal information 
system Lifos and are (as is most of the information available in this system) accessible to the 
public.  
The Migration Board’s legal position papers have been well received by other interested 
parties, though they might not always agree with the conclusions presented in a particular 
paper. UNHCR refers to the position papers as a key factor in the improvement of quality and 
predictability of Migration Board decisions.
39
 The quality of the legal position papers as such 
– the analysis and arguments presented – have steadily increased since the first papers were 
issued, partly as a result of the consultative process involving the UNHCR, NGOs and the 
migration courts (first and second-tier). A further reason is perhaps due to the fact that the 
Migration Board is the expert authority in the field and with the position papers has found an 
effective manner of systematising and communicating the knowledge that they possess.
40
 The 
international perspective of asylum law and the fact that no national asylum authority operates 
in an exclusively national context is increasingly acknowledged in the position papers, as the 
references to international case law from international and regional courts and monitoring 
bodies as well as other jurisdictions appear to be steadily increasing.  
The introduction of legal position papers, the number of papers published since 2009 and the 
wide range of issues they address suggests that the Migration Board is trying to remedy the 
lack of authoritative guidance from the Migration Court of Appeal by introducing their own 
system of advice and direction. Though it should not be seen as the only or even the main 
reason for producing internal guidelines, frustration over the lack of precedents and country 
guidance from the place of final instance in the asylum system occasionally shines through in 
the position papers. One illustrative example is the January 2011 legal position paper on 
methods for examining and assessing the future risks for persons seeking asylum based on 
their sexual orientation.
41
 Here it is pointed out that the guidance found in national legislation 
and case law on this point is limited, and that the Migration Board had accordingly turned to 
the United Kingdom’s Supreme Court judgment in  HJ (Iran) & HT (Cameroon) v SSHD (HJ 
and HT), [2010] UKSC 31. This judgment was referred to as providing a method for assessing 
the claims based on these grounds as being “far more constructive than what is offered in our 
national law and case law”.42       
                                                 
38
http://lifos.migrationsverket.se/sokning.html?category=1122&sort=creationDate&baseQuery=r%C3%A4ttsligt
+st%C3%A4llningstagande+&page=6 (last visited 1 July 2013).  
39
 Liv Feijen & Emelia Frennmark  Kvalitet i svensk asylprövning : en studie av Migrationsverkets utredning av 
och beslut om internationellt skydd, Stockholm, UNHCR/Migrationsverket, 2011,  210.  
40
 Ibid.  
41
 RCI 03/2011. 
42
 Ibid,  4.  
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3. The United Kingdom  
3.1. A few notes on the UK legal system  
The differences between the Swedish and the UK legal systems are many and varied. This is a 
result both of the differences in the systems as such and in the legal cultures.
43
 The English 
legal structure is a common law system that has had a substantial influence on the legal 
arrangements of many other countries. The term ‘common law system’ refers to forms of law-
making, particularly judge-made law. The role of judge-made law or case law is one of the 
distinguishing features of the common law system. This, however, does not mean that 
legislation or statute law plays a less important role than it would in a civil law system; rather 
a slightly different one. Parliament is legally the supreme law-making body and can make 
laws on any subject it chooses. The difference can be described as the text, and therefore the 
content, of a statute being fixed whereas judge-made law is non-fixed, having been 
ascertained from a case which can be developed or clarified in later cases.
44
 In any conflict 
between statutory law and case law, statutory law prevails.  
The principal sources of UK law are legislation (primary and delegated), common law (case 
law), European Union law and the European Convention on Human Rights. The courts may 
also take into account custom and doctrine. Preparatory works are of limited importance, if 
any.
45
 The prominent role of case law emphasises the key part played by judges in the 
common law system. In the separation of powers between the legislature and the judiciary, the 
role of the judiciary is to interpret laws and to develop the common law, not to make law. The 
power accorded to judges for ‘shaping’ the law however must be regarded as considerable.46 
Adding to this power is the doctrine of binding judicial precedent (stare decisis), according to 
which judges can mould the interpretation and understanding of what the law ‘is’; an 
interpretation that is not only guiding or authoritative but legally binding on courts of lower or 
equal status (with certain exceptions). This binding force of judgments and the statements 
therein by a judge on points of law, and their consequent impact on future cases, could be 
argued to further enhance the key role played by the judiciary and by the individual judge in 
the system (at least in the higher instances).  
As for case law from international courts, judgments of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) must be followed by UK courts (as by courts in other EU countries). The 1998 
Human Rights Act by which the rights of the European Convention on Human Rights were 
incorporated into English law requires that the courts take into account judgments, decisions, 
declarations or advisory opinions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).
47
 This 
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does not mean that they are legally binding in general on English courts.
48
 Being a dualist 
country, it is a requirement that for an international treaty to have effect at national level in 
the UK it must be incorporated into national law by legislation. Decisions by treaty 
monitoring bodies such as the UN Human Rights Committee are not considered binding by 
English courts.  
3.2. The UK asylum appeals procedure in brief   
The first level in the UK asylum system is the United Kingdom Border Agency (UKBA), 
which examines applications and makes the first decisions on asylum and human rights 
claims. The UKBA is an agency of the Home Office. Most applicants have a right to appeal to 
the First Tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) and to remain in the UK while 
waiting for their appeal.
49
 The appeals system has changed on a number of occasions; the 
current Tribunal structure was introduced in 2010.
50
 There is a further right to appeal on the 
grounds of an error of law – that is, something more than a disagreement on the facts – to the 
Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber (UTIAC). The Upper Tribunal is a 
superior court of record and forms part of the Tribunals Service, an executive agency of the 
Ministry of Justice. Appeals are heard by one or more Senior or Designated Immigration 
Judges who are sometimes accompanied by non-legal members of the Tribunal. Permission 
for such an appeal is sought from the First Tier Tribunal and then, if refused, from the Upper 
Tribunal directly. On hearing an appeal, the Upper Tribunal can either decide the case for 
itself or remit it to the First Tier Tribunal.
51
 There is, provided certain conditions are fulfilled, 
a further right to appeal to the Court of Appeal. A prerequisite is that the grounds of appeal 
relate to a point of law. In cases of general importance, an appeal can be made to the United 
Kingdom Supreme Court.
52
 Additionally to the appeals process, there is the possibility of 
judicial review. The system is somewhat complex, but as the aim of this paper is not to 
analyse the asylum process the details will not be given on what is required for an appeal to 
be heard by the higher courts.
53
   
The judges of the First Tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal are recognised experts in the 
field of asylum and immigration law, their work being exclusively concerned with asylum, 
immigration, human rights and the free movement law. Blake indicates that the role of the 
Tribunal as a specialist tribunal with a greater inquisitorial role than the common law courts 
means that courts who sit in judgment on the Tribunal’s decisions must accord considerable 
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obliged to implement judgments to which they are parties. 
49
 Applicants who have already claimed asylum in a safe third country or who have been found to have produced 
manifestly unfounded claims are usually only allowed to make an appeal after they have been removed from the 
UK. There is also the parallel system of fast-track procedures. For a pedagogical overview, see Gina Clayton 
Textbook on Immigration and Asylum Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012 (5
th
 ed.), 416-423.  
50
 The current structure is described in the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 c.15 (TCEA) Chapter 2.  
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weight to the assessments made.
54
 That said, Blake emphasises the responsibility of the 
Tribunal not only to deploy its expertise but to do so fairly and transparently and to be willing 
to review positions taken and first impressions.
55
 
3.3. Country Guidance cases in the UK asylum system   
As indicated earlier, the importance of reliable, relevant, updated and sufficient country of 
origin information in asylum cases cannot be overestimated. This information is the basis for 
substantiating or refusing a claim for protection made by an applicant and must be thoroughly 
examined and assessed. While every asylum claim is unique to the individual asylum seeker, 
it is inevitable that similar background issues will fall to be proved in different cases. For the 
government agency or the court to assess (substantially) the same facts repeatedly is time-
consuming, not least when there are many applicants of the same nationality and background. 
This can lead to different interpretations and conclusions about the existence and degree of 
risk on return being reached from the same facts, which in turn can have a negative effect on 
the legal security.
56
 There is also the problem of judges being presented with different 
information leading to different outcomes in very similar cases, which can lead to accusations 
of arbitrariness. In the case of the UK, this problem has been addressed by the introduction of 
so-called country guidance cases, providing authoritative guidance on generally recurring 
country issues produced by senior judges of the Upper Asylum Tribunal.
57
  
The idea of a ‘factual precedent’ was first suggested in UK case law in S & Ors v SSHD 
[2002]
58
 even though the practice of authoritative decisions had existed for a number of 
years.
59
 In this judgment in the Court of Appeal Lord Justice Laws stated that even though 
“the notion of a judicial decision which is binding as to fact is foreign to the common law”60 
the repeated hearing of evidence on similar or even identical factual issues in case after case 
constituted a problematic waste of judicial and financial resources, as well as giving rise to 
the risk or even the likelihood of inconsistent results.
61
 Therefore the idea of a factual 
precedent, thus relieving the court from examining substantial amounts of country 
information in each individual case, is argued to be “in the context of the IAT’s 
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responsibilities […] in principle to be benign and practical”.62 For such a practice to be 
acceptable, it is emphasised in S & Ors v SSHD that a number of safeguards have to apply, 
including: the decision must be sufficiently comprehensive; all the real issues must be 
addressed; there must be a careful explanation of the court’s position on the relevant country 
information; and that particular attention is paid to expert advice.
63
 The facts of the individual 
case must furthermore always be examined in order to assess properly the risk for the 
individual applicant.   
Though the practice of country guidance cases was considered controversial from the 
beginning (for reasons that we will return to) it grew quickly after S & Ors v SSHD. In 2004 
the concept was given a statutory basis.
64
 It has since exercised significant influence both 
within the appeals and asylum processes in general.
65
 A country guidance case will usually 
consist of one or more appeals heard together that have been identified at a case management 
hearing as appropriate for the task of issuing guidance for the assessment of risk upon 
return.
66
 In many cases these are individual appeals that have already been within the appeal 
system for a period and where some judicial decision has been made.
67
 At the hearing a wider 
range of country information than usual will be considered and country experts might be 
called to give oral evidence. It should be emphasised that even though a case is listed as a 
potential country guidance case the main focus of the Tribunal is the resolution of the 
individual case. Broader country guidance is considered an additional component, though a 
valuable one.
68
  
Once a case has been decided it is submitted to the Reporting Committee of the Upper 
Tribunal by the judges deciding it together with the Country Guidance Convenor. It is the 
Reporting Committee who decides if a case is to be designated as a country guidance case 
(‘CG’). This will only happen if the case provides a balanced, impartial and authoritative 
assessment of available country information and is sufficiently well reasoned and consistent 
with binding statutory provisions or precedents of senior courts – in short, if it is of such 
general significance that it can provide guidance relevant for subsequent appeals.
69
 Unstable 
or fluid conditions in a particular country do not preclude a case from being designated as 
country guidance. What matters is the particular context and whether conclusions can be 
drawn concerning risk categories.
70
 That said, an unstable situation where things change 
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rapidly could justify not providing country guidance, since it would be at risk of quickly 
becoming out of date.  
Before a case is published it is given a title and a head-note summarising the issue upon which 
guidance is given, and it will have been drafted; both are subject to approval by the Reporting 
Committee. Country Guidance cases are published, bearing the letters ‘CG’, on the Upper 
Tribunal case database.
71
 The range of issues on which country guidance cases has been 
produced is broad. Thomas identifies three general trends: first, country guidance linked to the 
application of a legal concept from the field of refugee, asylum, or human rights law; second, 
the identification of particular categories of persons who might be at risk on return to their 
country of origin and third, the enumeration of risk factors which are likely to be relevant 
when assessing the degree of risk on return in any individual case.
72
 One reflection here is that 
the term ‘country guidance’ might be misleading because the guidance provided is not 
restricted to the situation in a particular country even though it is issued in the context of an 
individual appeal against the return to a particular state.  
Once the case is reported as a CG case, its status can be described as follows:   
an authoritative finding on the country guidance issue identified in the 
determination…as a result, unless it has been expressly superseded or replaced by any 
later ‘CG’ determination, or is inconsistent with other authority binding the Tribunal, 
such a country guidance case is authoritative in any subsequent appeal, so far as that 
appeal a) relates to the country guidance issue in question, and b) depends upon the 
same or similar evidence.
73
    
Blake summarises the effect of designating a case as one of country guidance in the following 
way: where an issue arises in a later case that previously has been considered in a CG case, 
the CG case must be referred to in deciding the subsequent appeal; where there is no material 
change in the evidence considered in the CG case the judge should regard the guidance as 
authoritative and apply it provided the evidence in the latter case is the same or similar; if the 
issue in the subsequent appeal is identical to that in the GC case then it will be decided in the 
same way as the guiding case but it remains the responsibility of the judge in the subsequent 
case to assess the impact of the CG case on the particular case if relevant and credible 
material of a different risk assessment has emerged which was not available to the Tribunal at 
the time of deciding the CG case.
74
 In short, the CG case is to be considered authoritative if 
new circumstances have not appeared changing the scene from when the decision in the CG 
case was made. Normally it would be considered an error of law to do otherwise.
75
  
The country guidance provided by a case singled out as a CG case, however, is obviously not 
set in stone as they are only valid until replaced by subsequent guidance. This temporal 
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validity may vary depending on the nature of the issues dealt with.
76
 Country guidance on 
social and religious causes – women’s or LGBT rights, conversion – might have greater 
longevity than guidance on the political situation in a certain country or region because the 
former tends to change at a slower pace. The Tribunal has pointed out that the time elapsing 
since the making of a country guidance decision can be both a risk of caution to those 
applying it – making it even more important than usual to take fresh country information into 
account when assessing the individual appeal – and a signal that new guidance on the same 
issue is needed.
77
 Furthermore, a country guidance case can be appealed to a higher court, 
which may or may not come to a different conclusion.  
Finally, something should be said about the binding effect of country guidance cases. The 
reference in S by Lord Justice Laws to ‘factual precedents’ can be misinterpreted, since this 
means that these decisions must be followed by a subsequent court on the same or lower level. 
‘Guidance’, on the other hand, should be followed unless there is good reason not to. In the 
case of country guidance cases ‘good reason’ would be that it does not apply to the particular 
facts in an appeal, that there is new evidence showing that the original reasoning should be 
revised, or that the passage of time has rendered the guidance obsolete.
78
 Even if the guidance 
is authoritative, it is not to be regarded as binding indefinitely – it has, as was explained by 
the Tribunal in 2005 in NM v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Lone Women-
Ashraf) Somalia CG [2005], “the flexibility to accommodate individual cases, changes, fresh 
evidence and the other circumstances”.79 In NM it is strongly emphasised that a country 
guidance case is not legally binding in the way a precedent should be understood,
80
 while 
Blake somewhat less categorically asserts that “the differences may be marginal although the 
public perception could be important”.81  
4. Benefits and disadvantages of the two approaches  
For an outsider, the UK country guidance system at first glance appears to be efficient, time-
saving, and a functioning safeguard of consistency in relation to the treatment of general 
country conditions. It also appears a somewhat inevitable step to take, considering the number 
of asylum applications submitted in the country each year, many of those invoking similar 
circumstances and risks of future persecution. The system, however, has its disadvantages. 
Thomas in his 2011 analysis
82
 identifies a number of concerns which will be returned to 
below. In Sweden, on the other hand, even though the number of asylum applications 
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submitted in Sweden each year is higher
83
 than in the UK and hence the need for structured 
guidance presumably is equally pressing, the Migration Court of Appeal has chosen not to 
introduce a system of authoritative guidance on country conditions. In this section, the 
benefits and criticisms of the two different approaches are discussed. For clarity the 
arguments are roughly divided into two groups: “efficiency/the time factor” and “consistency, 
legal certainty and individual justice”. In practice however, the categories are intertwined and 
difficult to separate.   
4.1 Efficiency/the time factor  
If efficiency is a primary goal, the benefits of the UK country guidance system would appear 
quite obvious: the system makes it possible for both the parties and judiciary to know what 
the Tribunal considers relevant guidance and where to look for it, as well as indicating to the 
parties and the lower courts what to deal with and what has to be the object of their evidence 
or argument.
84
 It contributes to the efficiency of the asylum process because the same material 
will not have to be assessed in each individual case. This allows judges and parties to 
concentrate on the relevant issues. The Court of Appeal put it this way in SG (Iraq) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWCA Civ 940 (13 July 2012):  
46. The system of Country Guidance determinations enables appropriate resources, in 
terms of the representations of the parties to the Country Guidance appeal, expert and 
factual evidence and the personnel and time of the Tribunal, to be applied to the 
determination of conditions in, and therefore the risks of return for persons such as the 
appellants in the Country Guidance appeal to, the country in question. The procedure is 
aimed at arriving at a reliable (in the sense of accurate) determination. 
47. It is for these reasons, as well as the desirability of consistency, that decision 
makers and tribunal judges are required to take Country Guidance determination into 
account, and to follow them unless very strong grounds supported by cogent evidence, 
are adduced justifying their not doing so. 
Turning now to the drawbacks, one such pointed out by Thomas is that some country 
guidance decisions on the list are of marginal use as they apply to countries from which 
applicants appear infrequently, thus meaning that the Tribunal’s time and resources has been 
unnecessarily spent.
85
 The second difficulty is that the focus on country guidance of general 
applicability might lead to that country issues that are relevant only for a limited number of 
applicants might not receive the same kind of assessment.
86
 The third concern that Thomas 
lists is the time aspect – that is, the balance that has to be struck between ensuring that the 
guidance provided is sufficiently comprehensive and does not slow down the process in other 
appeals waiting for guidance to be produced and reported.
87
 Blake also addresses this 
problem, pointing out the costs of delay in assessing claims presented for the individual, who 
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is left in limbo waiting for the case to be decided while the circumstances pertaining to it can 
change or even cease to exist. There are also implications for society in terms of loss of public 
confidence ad the costs involved in providing livelihoods for those awaiting decisions. 
Additionally, it might prove difficult after a long wait to remove an unsuccessful applicant 
who might, for example, have started a family in the UK, thus being eligible to present claims 
under Article 8 of the ECHR on the principle of the best interests of the child.
88
  
The time aspect is also the issue of Thomas’s fourth concern, as in the risk of country 
guidance cases becoming out of date and therefore obsolete and inapplicable. Thomas here 
suggests that one way of solving the problem would be to limit the lifespan of country 
guidance cases so that they would automatically cease to be authoritative after a certain time. 
The difficulty with this approach however is that old country guidance may be perfectly 
applicable and removing its status would cause rather than solve problems.
89
 Further concerns 
include the amount of time it might take for a particular country issue to be finally resolved – 
in the light of Tribunal decisions being subject to the possibility of appeal – and that once 
issued, such guidance might have lost its point. 
In the case of Sweden, the lack of country guidance could be seen as having a negative effect 
on the efficiency of the asylum process as it requires the first tier courts and the Migration 
Board to include and analyse all available COI in the context of every individual case which 
is a time-consuming task. Having a precedent to follow also in this respect presumably would 
speed up the process. The Migration Court of Appeal however has a point when stating that in 
light of the fact that the Migration Court of Appeal only grants leave to appeal to a very 
limited number of all the applications it receives each year, country guidance judgments from 
the Court would be at risk of soon becoming out of date and hence inapplicable while still 
being “the last word” on the issue at hand.90 The efficiency of the process would be negatively 
affected as it would require the lower courts to ensure themselves that the applicable country 
guidance case is still relevant; thus having to do the work anyway in addition to explaining 
why the country guidance case is not applicable. When one considers that the precedents of 
the Migration Court of Appeal in many cases tend to be applied without considerable 
reflection by the adjudicator if there is new or additional information available that could lead 
to a different conclusion, it is uncertain if this additional check would be carried out in every 
individual case.
91
  
An obvious resolution of the time aspect issue would be to increase the number of cases 
granted leave to appeal. It can be mentioned in this context that the Migration Court of Appeal 
has been criticised for not producing sufficient precedents in general, thus leaving the lower 
courts and administrative bodies without guidance on a number of legal matters. This 
criticism of the Migration Court of Appeal on country guidance is thus part of general 
discontent over the Court’s approach to producing precedents as a whole. The question is how 
the introduction of a duty to produce country guidance cases would affect the number of 
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precedents issued in total, and what priority would be given to country guidance issues given 
that a number of matters of law so far remain uncommented by the Migration Court of 
Appeal.  
4.2 Consistency, legal certainty and individual justice  
Moving on to the matter of legal certainty, country guidance in the form applied in the UK 
system can moreover be argued to help ensure consistency and predictability in decision-
making and hence contribute to legal certainty. It is also a way of systematising and 
preserving knowledge of the conditions in a particular country or region for use in future 
cases, thus contributing to the correctness of risk assessment and the decisions reached.  
Concern has however been expressed over the use of country guidance in the UK leading to 
certainty and consistency taking priority over individual justice. This not least as the system 
somewhat undermines the principle that precedents are binding on points of law, not fact, and 
that the assessment of facts presented in a case should not be restricted or bound by factual 
findings in a previous dispute to which the parties in the case were not involved. Thomas 
summarises this particular critique thus: “country guidance is too blunt a tool with which to 
perform a sensitive and complex adjudicative task”.92 A related concern is that of what is 
referred to as the Tribunal’s strict approach, which is that country guidance is argued to limit 
rather than extend the range of individuals eligible for asylum.
93
 Thomas argues that a 
possible response to this critique would be to focus not only on the participation of the parties 
but also on the contribution of the expertise of the adjudicator and the possibilities opened by 
the inquisitorial approach for thoroughly investigating the issues of a particular case.
94
 This 
connects with Blake’s discussion on country guidance cases as interference in judicial 
discretion – that is, that judges would be deprived of the ability to reach appropriate, 
independent conclusions in the cases before them if they are obliged to follow the 
authoritative guidance presented in CG cases. In this context, Blake points out that this is not 
the intention with CG cases and that as no two are identical, individual assessment has all but 
ceased to matter.
95
 An illustration of the individuality of decision-making often referred to is 
found in the 2004 case of Otshudi v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] 
EWCA Civ 893, in which two conscientious decision makers came to very different 
conclusions on the same evidence.
96
 Blake however notes that as asylum protection is 
becoming less concerned with individuals in need of protection because of their individual 
actions or beliefs than with the absence of protection from harm in the country of return, 
country guidance which relieves the individual judge from examining and assessing vast 
amounts of more general country information does have its place.
97
 Country guidance cases 
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concerning Iraq and Somalia are two examples of when cases designated “CG” consider very 
broad categories of persons and, as a consequence, have an impact on a large number of 
asylum claims and appeals.
98
   
In the Swedish context, the opposite situation is a cause of concern as a lack of country 
guidance could be a breeding ground for inconsistency and arbitrariness in decision making, 
leading to a lack of predictability and hence unsatisfactory legal certainty for the individual. 
From the perspective of the lower instances, a guiding judgment providing a thorough, in-
depth expert analysis of the future risk for a particular group of the situation in a particular 
country undoubtedly is most helpful.
99
 It also counteracts the risk of the outcome of a case, at 
least to a certain extent, being made dependent on which of the three Migration Courts that 
handles the appeal.
100
  As pointed out above in relation to the UK, country guidance in this 
context is also useful for the applicant and his or her legal representative as it helps focus their 
argumentation on essential aspects, as well as on what points any additional COI might be 
needed. In a situation as the present in the Sweden where the main focus of presenting facts 
and investigating claims in the asylum process is placed in the first instance and where it is 
expected of the applicant to present all necessary information and evidence of the eligibility 
of his or her claim for protection, while at the same time limited remuneration is provided for 
the time spent by legal representatives on identifying and analysing country of origin 
information, country guidance in a broad sense could undoubtedly contribute to increased 
consistency in decision-making but also to increased legal certainty for the individual.  
The aforementioned legal position papers of the Migration Board have in the past few years 
surfaced as a means to cover the gap created by the lack of guiding judgments of this kind. 
One obvious complication, however, with the legal position papers is their unclear status. 
They have no formal legal status whatever and are only to be taken as internal guidelines 
intended for the presenting officers and decision makers of the Migration Board.
101
 The idea 
is for position papers to provide guidance for the decision makers in their application of the 
law, and should not refer to them in their decisions.
102
 At the same time, it is clear from the 
accompanying instructions that the Migration Board staff should follow the interpretation 
provided in position papers. The guidance that they provide on a growing number of issues 
thus in practice presumably will inevitably be regarded by the Migration Board staff as 
authoritative, and decisions or actions contrary to what is expressed in a legal position paper 
are likely to be changed or revoked.
103
 The informal status of the position papers therefore is 
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quite considerable, given their impact on the assessment and implementation of asylum and 
migration law in the individual case.  
As they are not sources of law, and not intended as such, their influence could prove 
problematic – particularly if they are also applied by the migration courts. There is a fine line 
to be drawn here. To refer to the Migration Board’s legal position papers as sources of 
country information is one thing, though using the primary source would be preferable. To 
apply the conclusions presented in a position paper of what constitutes the correct 
implementation of the law in the context of a particular country or for a particular group 
would, however, attribute far more weight to the non-binding conclusions of a place of lower 
instance than that for which they were intended, thus conferring on these conclusions a legal 
status they do not possess. In the words of a senior Migration Board official it “would turn the 
hierarchy of sources of law on its head”.104 This is particularly true if the analysis and 
conclusions presented in a paper were to be accepted without question. A quick and by no 
means complete look at case law of the Migration Courts from 2011 to 2013 indicates that 
legal position papers are referred to in a number of judgments, often in the context of the 
Migration Board having issued a legal position paper on the situation in particular country and 
that the Court found no reason to depart from the assessment. However, it is difficult to 
ascertain the influence a legal position paper might have had in an individual case, both 
because the Migration Courts are aware of their non-existent formal status and because it 
simply cannot be understood from the judgment itself. Summing up, even though the legal 
position papers might be a useful tool in ensuring consistency and predictability in decision-
making, they are by no means an acceptable alternative to country guidance provided by a 
senior court.   
5. Remarks  
So is it possible to conclude that one approach to country guidance is preferable to the other? 
The perhaps dull but expected answer is that it is not so much a matter of which system is the 
best objectively, but what best fits the country and legal system in which it is to be applied. 
For a practice of designating country guidance cases and thereby establishing a preferred 
interpretation of facts concerning a particular country or group of individuals to function, the 
presence of a number of factors is required. These include the availability of relevant 
expertise (internally and externally); the availability of cases suitable for the purpose of 
country guidance; the capacity and ability in terms of resources to review decisions within an 
acceptable time when such is required; and, last but not least, that the senior court (or judge) 
not only considers itself competent to analyse for example complex political situations in a 
foreign country, but also that it is necessary to do so in order to fulfil the task of providing 
guidance.  
In the UK context, the above mentioned factors appear to be present as well as a clearly 
expressed wish to promote consistency in decision making and to avoid as far as possible 
arbitrary decisions and what has been referred to as ‘refugee roulette’, i.e. where large 
numbers of judges can be placed in the position of deciding on the same issue by reference to 
variable amounts of country of origin information, and then finally coming to different 
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conclusions about it.
105
 The principle of treating like cases alike, and creating conditions for 
this goal to be achieved, thus appears to be a primary consideration. As a result, the 
difficulties inherent in the system discussed above, including the claim that individual justice 
is at risk of being overridden by the striving for predictability and stability, as well as the ever 
problematic time factor, does not seem to seriously challenge the system. The status and 
authority accorded in the UK to country guidance cases seems to have led to that country 
guidance is generally relied upon by all parties, not least judges, and that much is required for 
a judge to successfully depart from the findings of such a case without the decision being 
changed by a higher court.
106
 From the perspective of an outsider this approach comes across 
as, above all, practical and pragmatic and one that indeed includes safeguards for individual 
variations – as a country guidance case need not be applied if the circumstances of the case in 
question are not compatible – but where effectiveness, consistency and predictability is the 
main focus. The consequences for the individual case can be difficult to assess.  
Another important factor for the UK system of country guidance to have gained such 
widespread acceptance presumably is that the Upper Tribunal is not the place of final 
instance. As its decisions can be and occasionally are challenged and changed, there is room 
for correcting mistakes. Having said this, the authority of the Tribunal case law should not be 
underestimated, as the statement by Baroness Hale in Secretary of State for the Home 
Department (Appellant) v. AH (Sudan) and Others (FC) (Respondents), [2007] UKHL 49, 
underscores. It is most telling that Baroness Hale, while expressing some concern on the 
manner in which the Tribunal had assessed the risks in the particular case, still affirmed that 
the decisions of the Tribunal “should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have 
misdirected themselves in law”.107 An additional observation is the strong position of judges 
and the trust placed in them both as a collective and as individuals to be able to provide 
authoritative guidance not only on matters of law but also on fact, a position likely to be 
explained at least in part by the key importance of case law (and hence the judges) in the 
common law system in the development and interpretation of the law.  
It is uncertain whether all of the requirements described above are present to a sufficient 
extent in the Swedish context. As regards expertise, the Migration Court of Appeal is indeed 
the place of final instance in the field of migration law in Sweden. It is, however, yet to 
become a court where all judges have had specialised training and years of experience of 
migration law before being appointed – this has simply not been possible, given that the 
current migration court system was only established in 2006. Moreover, the majority of the 
judges of the Court also adjudicate in other fields of law as the Migration Court of Appeal is 
part of the Stockholm Administrative Court of Appeal. In consequence, there is likely to be 
less time available to develop one’s expertise not only in the legal aspects but also in the 
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prevailing situation in a particular country.
108
 The fact that the system is fairly young also 
means that there is a limited body of previous judgments and findings to draw upon, which 
suggests that the wheel sometimes would need to be reinvented.
109
 As for the availability of 
cases, this is unlikely to be a problem as such, but given the prerequisites for a case to be 
granted leave to appeal by the Migration Court of Appeal there might be difficulties in 
identifying and choosing which cases could be listed as possible country guidance cases – 
what criteria would be used to distinguish one case in a certain situation from another? Would 
the legal issue argued by the applicant still be decisive? As for the time factor, the Migration 
Court of Appeal, as mentioned above, has already been criticised for not producing sufficient 
judgments, suggesting (as has been pointed out by the Court itself) that by adding a category 
of cases that require regular review would only put even more pressure on the court and might 
even prove to be counterproductive.  
Finally, on the last factor it is clear that the Swedish Migration Court of Appeal considers it to 
be its main task to provide guidance on matters of law, not on facts. The Court has interpreted 
this as meaning guidance on matters of law as such, not in a wider perspective that could also 
include matters of fact that have an effect on the application of the law as such. It has been 
done, but only when the Court has seen that the case law of the lower courts has been 
inconsistent to the extent that legal security for the individual was at risk and where the main 
matter still could be interpreted as concerning the interpretation of the law.
110
 Whatever 
statement the Court has made on the situation in a particular country or region in that context 
however in general is to be regarded as applicable only to that particular case.
111
 Having this 
said, the Migration Court of Appeal is not unaware of the need to sometimes adopt a 
standpoint on country-related issues, as is illustrated by the impact of the Migration Court of 
Appeal judgments concerning the interpretation of the concept of ‘internal armed conflict’ in 
relation to Iraq (2007) and Somalia (2009 and 2011) respectively.
112
 It simply does not wish 
regularly to do so.  
This position, combined with a fear among the judiciary of the political aspects of migration 
law and of being accused of politicising legal decisions in order to follow government policy 
aiming to limit the number of asylum seekers, could be argued to lead to a reluctance on the 
part of the Court to provide judgments when such ‘political sensibility’ could be implied – for 
example, in deciding that the situation in a certain country does not constitute sufficient 
grounds for protection and hence many applications for asylum can be denied.
113
 Such 
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criticism was directed towards the previously mentioned controversial Migration Court of 
Appeal judgment on Iraq in February 2007 where the Court found that the situation in Iraq at 
the time did not meet the criteria of an internal armed conflict despite the media daily 
publishing pictures of the ongoing fighting and the Swedish Foreign Office referring to “the 
war in Iraq”.114 Before that judgment entered into force, a majority of the Iraqi asylum seekers 
had been granted asylum in Sweden. As a result of the judgment, subsidiary protection based 
on the existence of an internal armed conflict no longer was applicable and hence 
substantially fewer applicants were granted protection. In the context of the number of Iraqis 
that came to Sweden at the time and the difficulties the asylum system had in terms of 
resources to cope with the large numbers of asylum seekers, it is not difficult to understand 
that the judgment was questioned in terms of it being politically sensitive. Though this 
criticism was unfounded – the controversial conclusions drawn by the Court having more to 
do with an excessively strict interpretation of the criteria of an internal armed conflict than 
with aiming to curb the number of persons seeking asylum in Sweden – the experience might 
have acted as a deterrent. Of course these issues are no strangers to the UK debate, both in 
relation to country guidance cases which have been accused of being negative towards 
appellants – that is, limiting the range of people who qualify for asylum, and for example, in 
the context of humanitarian protection and discretionary leave in medical cases.
115
    
Summing up, the way in which the need for some kind of country guidance to lower courts 
and decision makers has been met so far in Sweden and the UK is quite different. In neither 
country is it formally impossible to provide guidance on how to interpret the situation in a 
particular country – on facts – but only in the UK so far is this considered to be part of what 
the court is supposed regularly to do. The answer to why this is so appears to be in part a 
matter of different legal cultures and in part more practical obstacles, such as a lack of time 
and perhaps experience in analysing the complex political and social situation of a particular 
country or region. Of these two, the cultural factor is likely to be the less obvious but in this 
author’s view the most important, as the legal culture of a country sets the framework for 
what the court and the judges consider their task to be, how this is best fulfilled and the 
limitations of these tasks.  
An overarching question in this discussion, and one that is likely to be continually discussed  
in the UK as well, is what one actually achieves with authoritative guidance in the 
interpretation of facts and how far one is prepared to go in order to ensure predictability and 
consistency in the determination of asylum cases. Indeed, treating like cases alike is a primary 
consideration, but must be placed in relation to the importance of avoiding falling into the trap 
of formulaic decision making. Storey has compared the country guidance system with the 
ECtHR system of “lead cases” that has developed in recent years – cases which, as Storey 
indicates, have had a considerable influence on all the Council of Europe state parties.
116
 The 
comparison is interesting, but as Strasbourg case law does not have the same binding status, 
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except in the context of a particular case, as a national precedent or decision providing 
authoritative guidance, its influence is perhaps less direct on lower courts than would be the 
case with decisions from a national court further up in the hierarchy.
117
 The signals sent out 
by a country guidance case or equivalent are strong and it would take, as has been discussed 
in this paper, quite a lot for a judge or decision maker not to follow them. All in all, the 
system still rests upon the ability of the individual judge or decision maker to determine when 
it is correct to apply an authoritative judgment and when it is not. The independence of the 
judge and the impartiality of his or her decision-making – those pillars upon which most 
judicial structures and cultures rest – thus remain the best safeguards for the legal security of 
the asylum-seeker, and for each claim for protection to be examined with respect shown to its 
unique features.   
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